Admissibility of incriminating statements, admissions, or confessions must be examined in terms of whether or not the encounter is an ordinary traffic stop or a custodial interrogation which requires the procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda. Issues related to admission of laboratory results must be decided based on the confrontation clause analysis provided in Crawford, Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz.
Miranda and DUI
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.W. 420 (1984)
We hold therefore that a person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested. . .
The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly non-coercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
Pennsylvania v. Bruder
, 488 U.S. 9, 109 S. Ct. 205 (1988)
The facts in this record, which Bruder does not contest, reveal the same noncoercive aspects as the Berkemer detention: "a single police officer ask[ing] respondent a modest number of questions and request[ing] him to perform a simple balancing test at a location visible to passing motorists." 468 U. S., at 442 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, Berkemer's rule, that ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda, governs this case.
Mosteller, Robert P. “Police Deception before Miranda Warnings: The case for per se exclusion of an entirely unjustified practice at a particularly sensitive moment,” Duke Law School Faculty Scholarship Series, (March 2008). This essay sketches some of the major dimensions of deception that courts allow under the Supreme Court’s Miranda and voluntariness doctrine. It also examines generally deception practiced before police secure a waiver from the suspect.
Thomas, George C. III. “ ‘Truth Machines’ and Confessions Law in the Year 2046,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 5, (2007). In order to understand what confessional laws, like the Miranda law, will look like in the future, we must first look at the past and how it was developed.
Dripps, Donald. “Is the Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A proposed fifth amendment synthesis,” University of San Diego School of Law, (February 2000). This article argues that consistency does not require major changes in the law. In only five cases has the Court approved the admission of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda. Thus the use of previously compelled testimony for impeachment does not constitute a renewed violation of the Fifth Amendment, and adequate deterrence of the pretrial compulsion satisfies the Fifth Amendment.
Fields, Michele. “Legal and Constitutional Issues Related to Detection,” TRB Circular E-C020: Issues and Methods in the Detection of Alcohol and Other Drugs, (September 2000). This workshop’s focus is on police detection of alcohol and other drugs among drivers of private motor vehicles.
, Bullcoming and DUI
Williams v. Illinois, U.S. Supreme Court, (June 18, 2012). An expert may base an opinion without violating the Confrontation Clause to results of tests and experiments conducted by others, even when said expert has no firsthand knowledge of the testing procedure utilized. This case is an exception to the holdings in Crawford and Bullcoming.
Crawford v. Washington
124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004)
Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
, 564 U.S. _ (June 23, 2011)
The accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist.
Latimer, Jerome C. “Confrontation After Crawford: The Decision’s Impact on How Hearsay is Analyzed Under the Confrontation Clause,” Seton Hall Law Review 36, 2 (November 2011). This article examines the facts and findings in the Crawford case and analyzes how it will impact the Confrontation Clause.
McLain, Lynn. “The Confrontation Clause after Crawford v. Washington,” Montgomery County State’s Attorney’s Office, University of Baltimore School of Law (May 2007). This articles gives a background on the confrontation clause, how it applies in this case, and how it can be applied in the future.
Baugh, Whitney. “Why the Sky Didn’t Fall: Using judicial creativity to circumvent Crawford v. Washington,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 38 (June 2005). Many commentators argue that the impact of Crawford on the criminal justice system will be monumental. A trend in the lower courts that have actually applied Crawford, however, reveals that in practice the breadth and applicability of the decision may not be as far-reaching as initially anticipated.
Warrants for BAT and DUI
Commonwealth v. Shaw (January 20, 2000)
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned a conviction of driving under the influence and failing to stop at a clearly marked stop line, where the police violated the defendant’s rights under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution when they obtained the results of a blood alcohol test without a warrant.
Dyarman, Melendez-Diaz and DUI
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Mary A Dyarman, PA Super 245 (2011)
A prior statement that is not "testimonial," however, does not implicate the confrontation clause and is admissible, so long as it falls within a hearsay exception.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (U.S. 2009)
“We do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case. While... it is the obligation of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody, this does not mean that everyone who laid hands on the evidence must be called.”
Commonwealth v. Barton-Martin, 5 A.3d 363, 368 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Based upon that reasoning, the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz relied upon Crawford to conclude that "[a]bsent a showing that the analysts [of the cocaine] were unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, [the defendant] was entitled to `be confronted with' the analysts at trial."
The trial court admitted the lab report. The Commonwealth did not present the laboratory technician who performed the test on Appellant's blood sample. Therefore, that portion of the Commonwealth's case that was dependent upon [the defendant's] BAC level was proven with the very type of ex parte out-of-court report ruled inadmissible (without the opportunity for confrontation) in Melendez-Diaz.
Language Barriers and DUI
Rodriquez v. State No. S02A0412 (June 24, 2002).
The Georgia Supreme Court held that a non-English-speaking defendant convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol was not denied equal protection or due process under the United States Constitution or the Georgia Constitution when the results of his blood-alcohol tests were admitted to trial, even though the implied consent warning required under the Office Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section 40-5-67.1 was not read or interpreted in a language that the defendant could understand.